What Korea can learn and prepare for after two months of Trump

By Lee Jong-eun

Has it really been only two months since U.S. President Donald Trump’s second inauguration? While significant policy changes were expected with the return of his presidency, many — including myself —were surprised by the scale and speed with which the Trump administration has pushed revisions of decades-long U.S. foreign policy, particularly in trade and security.

Europe and the Americas have mostly borne the first wave of policy changes under Trump’s second presidency. U.S. tariffs have increased on certain imports from Canada and Mexico, triggering retaliatory tariffs from both countries. Europe, facing challenges from raising U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs, faces security challenges from the threat of U.S. disengagement from Europe’s security deterrence from Russia. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s territorial pursuits in Greenland and Panama, along with its accelerated deportation of undocumented migrants, have impacted the political landscape across multiple regions in the Western Hemisphere.

South Korea has been more fortunate than other U.S. allies in mostly avoiding bilateral conflict with the Trump administration. One reason may be because Trump's administration has prioritized focusing on other global issues. Another reason could be that South Korea has been led by an interim government since President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment in December, limiting its ability to engage in bilateral diplomacy with the United States. Paradoxically, the Trump administration may be postponing negotiations with South Korea until the country has a leader it considers a suitable diplomatic counterpart.

However, South Korea is unlikely to remain insulated from the geopolitical impact of the Trump administration’s foreign policies for long. First, Trump has signaled forthcoming diplomatic demands regarding bilateral trade, cost-sharing for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and South Korean investment in U.S. domestic shipbuilding and energy development. They will have significant consequences for South Korea’s economy and security. Third, South Korea should prepare for the possible resumption of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea, lest South Korea finds its security vulnerable to a future deal between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, similar to the risks Ukraine currently faces from Trump’s diplomacy with Russia.

As the South Korean government prepares for its turn in bilateral diplomacy, it should observe other countries’ diplomatic encounters so far with the Trump administration. Specifically, three recurring features have been observed in Trump’s foreign policy approaches during his second term.

First, Trump is selective in alternating between engagement or disengagement in international crises. In the past two months, a lot of attention has been on Trump’s threat to disengage or at least minimize U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war with Russia. During the same period, however, he has also threatened military intervention in the Israel-Hamas war and ordered airstrikes against Houthi militant groups in Yemen. Trump is not a defender of international institutions, but neither is he an isolationist or a pacifist. His administration may express aloof indifference or aggressive interest in the affairs of other countries depending on the calculation of strategic and political benefits from the policy decision.

Second, Trump prioritizes "optics," particularly in portraying his administration’s diplomatic successes. In the Israel-Hamas war, he has taken credit for Hamas’ partial release of Israeli hostages and has invited hostage families to the White House to publicize his advocacy on their behalf. Even when encountering diplomatic obstacles, Trump frames them as progress or acts of benevolence on his part. For example, he has characterized postponing a comprehensive tariff hike on Canada and Mexico as an accommodation to allow U.S. manufacturers an adjustment period. Similarly, he has depicted Putin’s ambiguous response to a U.S. ceasefire proposal as a constructive step toward a peace settlement.

Third, Trump is “flexible” in shifting his stance on international issues. Though Trump’s overall foreign policy strategy (such as on immigration, tariffs and alliances) generally appears to stay consistent, Trump has frequently shifted his timetable, demand or rhetoric, increasing uncertainty in negotiations.

On tariffs, the Trump administration has repeatedly revised the timeline for comprehensive tariff increases on Canada and Mexico. Regarding Ukraine, Trump had accused Zelenskyy of insufficient gratitude to the United States and for opposing the peace settlement, temporarily suspending aid and intelligence support to Ukraine. Later, Trump accepted Zelenskyy’s apology and suggested new sanctions on Russia to incentivize war settlement. In response to his failure to fulfill his campaign pledge to end the war within “24 hours” after returning to the White House, Trump dismissed his previous timeline as a “sarcastic announcement,” reiterating that he would ultimately end the war.

For South Korea, analyzing these characteristics is important for anticipating and planning diplomatic negotiations with the U.S. government. First, South Korea should weigh the risks/benefits of incentivizing Trump’s proactive engagement in U.S.-Korea relations before calculating how much transactional contributions South Korea should offer to the latter in the areas of trade, technology and security. Second, South Korean policymakers should strategize to ensure that the Trump administration receives public credit for a diplomatic “win” while securing substantive diplomatic gains for South Korea as well.

Finally, South Korean negotiators should be prepared for dynamic fluctuations throughout their negotiations with the Trump administration. They should not be lulled into complacency by a positive reception from their counterparts, as it may be unexpectedly reversed. Nor should they become overly discouraged by diplomatic setbacks, as these may be moderated through persistent negotiations or fortuitous changes in international circumstances.

Currently, South Korea’s pressing political challenge is to quickly resolve political uncertainties and divisions since the aftermath of Yoon’s impeachment. Regardless of what happens to South Korean politics in the next several months, I hope that South Korea will soon have a president and government prepared to lead the country in successfully navigating diplomatic relations with the Trump administration.

Lee Jong-eun is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.