By Mason Richey
Since my last column in early December, South Korea has experienced massive political turmoil. On Dec. 3, President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law, seemingly as part of an attempted self-coup. Several hours later the National Assembly managed to convene a plenary session to revoke the martial law decree. The ensuing 10 days were marked by political chaos, including a failed National Assembly vote to impeach Yoon, arrests and impeachments of government ministers and a leadership vacuum in the president’s office. On Dec. 14, Yoon was finally impeached by the National Assembly and suspended from his duties.
This did not stabilize the situation. Acting President Han Duck-soo was impeached on Dec. 27, after refusing to confirm the nominations of three Constitutional Court justices necessary to provide legitimacy for its ruling on Yoon’s impeachment. On Dec. 30, a Seoul court issued an arrest warrant for Yoon, who is accused of insurrection by a joint investigative body (the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials, prosecutors and police). A Jan. 3 attempt to serve the warrant at the presidential residence led to an armed standoff between law enforcement and the Presidential Security Service (PSS). Acting President Choi Sang-mok has apparently refused to order the PSS to stand down. Social tension is also high, as pro- and anti-Yoon supporters gather daily in the streets. In short, South Korea is in a profound institutional political crisis. South Korea’s status as a liberal democratic upholder of domestic rule of law is under threat.
The U.S. response to all of this has been underwhelming. Aside from a Dec. 5 statement by Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell calling Yoon’s actions “illegitimate,” the Biden administration has not volunteered public condemnation of Yoon’s apparent self-coup via martial law, the leadership vacuum from Dec. 3 to 13 (when a triumvirate of Han Duck-soo, Han Dong-hoon and Yoon attempted to run state affairs) or Yoon’s seeming violation of the rule of law in resisting arrest for the insurrection charges. Mostly, Biden’s team has called for “stability,” repeated a mantra invoking the “ironclad” nature of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and offered bromides hoping that South Korea would resolve its crisis by constitutional processes.
Perhaps private communication between the Biden administration and South Korean leaders has been more forceful in insisting on holding Yoon accountable and restoring South Korea to normal liberal democratic functioning of its constitutional order. But there is not much evidence for this. Rather, the U.S. has prioritized pretending that things are business as usual. In early January, the allies agreed to “fully resume” normal diplomatic and security activities. For example, the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group has been reactivated following its brief postponement after the martial law declaration. Secretary of State Antony Blinken — who was in Seoul this week for meetings as though nothing unusual had happened — released a readout that made no mention of South Korea’s political situation. His response to a direct question about the U.S. position on Yoon’s actions vaguely referenced private intergovernmental discussions before pivoting to boilerplate about democratic resilience. Despite a shocking breach of liberal democracy, Seoul has faced the bare minimum of consequences from its supposed “democratic values-based partner.” Why?
The diplomatic answer is that it would be inappropriate for the U.S. to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state. This is nonsense — the U.S. has a long history of influencing the internal affairs of allies and adversaries alike. A second, charitable interpretation is that the outgoing Biden administration believes it cannot do much about South Korea’s democracy crisis anyway. Indeed, the Donald Trump administration takes office on Jan. 20 and is likely to devalue democracy as a factor in its foreign relations. Perhaps correctly, the Biden team might have figured that it would not have leverage to affect South Korean politics. Yet another possibility is that the Biden administration simply does not care as much about democratic values as it has claimed over the last four years of emphasizing “values-based diplomacy.” Major powers are no strangers to hypocrisy.
South Korean leaders and the general public may consider themselves fortunate to have avoided significant public censure from the Biden administration. This is short-sighted.
First, in the short term, Seoul needs the Biden administration to clarify that the unconstitutional use of the military in the service of martial law threatens the alliance, and that a return to robust democratic constitutional order is critical to maintaining “ironclad” U.S.-South Korea relations. Continuing down the current path of chaos makes it easier for the Trump administration to sell a U.S. Forces Korea drawdown, or even alliance rupture, to a U.S. Congress and public otherwise supportive of the alliance.
Second, and more importantly, South Korea’s hard-won democracy has been regressing for nearly a decade, and the current situation represents a dramatic worsening of the trend. Moreover, the country is deeply polarized politically, which will be exacerbated by the ongoing constitutional crisis. In turn, greater political division will make harder the political institutional reforms required to strengthen South Korea’s democracy. Seoul needs the jolt of its ally telling it some hard truths. This might sting, but it would make clear where South Korea’s interests lie, and encourage political compromise and unity.
These words are unlikely to be offered, and South Korea will be worse off for it.
Mason Richey is a professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, president of the Korea International Studies Association and editor-in-chief of the Journal of East Asian Affairs.
English (United States) ·