Reasons for hope as Trump returns to power

Shift in policies will trigger stable, revised international order

By Lee Jong-eun

President Donald Trump has returned to the Oval Office, becoming the first U.S. president since Grover Cleveland in 1892 to serve a second nonconsecutive term. Unlike his initial presidential victory in 2016, his second win has elicited less international shock and fewer domestic protests. However, beneath the surface of relative calm, multiple anxieties linger about what the next four years of his presidency may bring.

Internationally, there are concerns that Trump’s second term could usher in more radical and turbulent changes than his first. No longer constrained by the need to run for reelection and likely to fill White House and Cabinet positions with personally loyal and ideologically aligned officials, the Trump administration is expected to be more assertive in advancing its “America First” foreign policy.

Building on policies implemented during his first term, Trump’s second term could further weaken U.S. commitments to international institutions and agreements, escalate geopolitical tensions with China and Iran, disengage from certain regional conflicts in Europe and Asia, and elevate protectionist barriers to international trade. Trump’s recent comments regarding the acquisition of Greenland and the Panama Canal have also heightened concerns about his administration’s pursuit of stronger regional hegemony in the Americas.

These “international challenges” are not predisposed to escalate into “international catastrophes.” While the geopolitical shifts that began during Trump’s first term may accelerate in his second, my hope is that through engagement and collaboration, international and U.S. policymakers can ensure changes take place with mitigated costs, a predictable trajectory and an eventual transition to a revised, yet relatively stable international order.

First, the Trans-Atlantic alliance is likely to undergo adjustments as the Trump presidency shifts U.S. strategic priorities away from Europe and increases pressure on European allies to bolster their military capabilities. The Russia-Ukraine war will likely conclude with an armistice, with Europe expected to shoulder a greater share of the responsibility for Ukraine’s reconstruction and postarmistice security. My hope, however, is that the balance of power between Europe and Russia will be preserved, deterring Russia’s further territorial ambitions.

Second, the Trump presidency is likely to withdraw again from the Paris Climate Accords and prioritize energy security over reducing carbon emissions. U.S. restrictions on fossil fuel drilling and exports will likely be loosened, potentially encouraging other countries to adopt similar measures. My hope is that the Trump administration can be persuaded to also support the development of alternative energy technologies to maintain the U.S.' technological competitiveness with China in the energy sector.

Third, the U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry will likely intensify over trade, technology and control of maritime routes. U.S. allies, in particular, may face increased pressure to explicitly align with the U.S. and “decouple” from China. My hope is that domestic economic interests would incentivize the Trump administration to maintain overall trade relations with China, similar to U.S.-Soviet trade relations during the Cold War. Trump’s aversion to entrapment in overseas wars may help restrain security tensions over areas such as Taiwan and the South China Sea from escalating into conventional military conflicts.

Fourth, as in his first term, Trump may withdraw the U.S. from certain international institutions such as the World Health Organization and UNESCO. My hope is that the Trump administration will support other institutions and partnerships that are perceived as aligning with U.S. strategic interests. In the Asia-Pacific region, the Trump administration may continue to strengthen security partnerships such as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States) and AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) to bolster strategic containment against China. Additionally, the administration may be persuaded to view economic partnerships with other countries as beneficial to revitalizing the U.S. domestic manufacturing sector and offsetting the costs of trade conflicts with China.

Lastly, South Korea and Japan will likely face pressure to justify the strategic value of their security alliances with the United States, including potentially contentious negotiations over the cost and size of U.S. troop deployments in their countries. During Trump’s second term, North Korea’s nuclear threat may be sidelined in favor of other domestic or international priorities, or alternatively, a deal may be proposed that would recognize North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. My hope is that South Korea and Japan will effectively communicate their economic, technological and military contributions to the “burden-sharing” of U.S. geopolitical strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Whether by supporting South Korea and Japan in enhancing their nuclear deterrence capabilities, driving a wedge in the China-Russia-DPRK strategic alignment, or maintaining a robust U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership, the Trump administration may be persuaded to help its allies maintain strategic balance — even achieve superiority — in Northeast Asia. DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name. ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.

Of course, hope alone does not guarantee a favorable outcome. Some diplomatic overtures may fail to satisfy Trump’s transactional approach to bargaining, potentially resulting in negative consequences for the affected regions. Even when transactional deals are achieved, individual countries may face significant economic and security burdens, as well as heightened geopolitical uncertainties, during a second Trump presidency.

It may be helpful, however, to recall the successful international agreements achieved during Trump’s first term, such as the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. Trump’s “America First” agenda may be complemented with “America First, but Not Alone” through skillful strategic and diplomatic statecraft. As diplomacy played a crucial role in ensuring the Cold War ended “not with a bang but a whimper,” diplomacy may play a crucial role in ensuring the geopolitical changes of Trump’s second term unfold “as a wave, not tsunami.”

With strategic agility and a measure of good fortune, I hope countries will navigate the geopolitical wave toward eventual international stability — one that encompasses “liberal and illiberal,” “U.S.-aligned and non U.S.-aligned” countries under a new pattern of the international system. Following Hegel’s thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics, the new system may be different from the “Liberal International Order,” but enforces its own rules for order and coexistence.

Lee Jong-eun is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.