Quo vadis, Korea?

By Yun Byung-se

The late Donald Rumsfeld, former U.S. defense secretary, is renowned for his oft-quoted remarks on the complexities of policy analysis, famously distinguishing between "known knowns," "known unknowns," and "unknown unknowns." Reflecting on the year 2024, most global events fit neatly into one of these categories. Yet, several developments last year defied the most imaginative foresight.

Among these were North Korea’s direct involvement in the Ukraine-Russia war, Donald Trump’s unprecedented trifecta victory in the U.S. presidential and congressional elections and the abrupt collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, alongside the downfall of other pro-Iranian forces in the Middle East. Additionally, political uncertainties in mature democracies such as Japan, France, Germany and South Korea severely undermined the leadership of incumbent governments, as evidenced by election outcomes, no-confidence votes and plummeting approval ratings. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s aborted martial law and its aftermath is the latest example of “thinking the unthinkable.”

These new challenges, coupled with ongoing polycrises on the geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-technological fronts worldwide, present turbulent waters for South Korean diplomacy to navigate in the New Year, particularly during the transitional period of the impeachment process and beyond. The nation must confront as many “unknown unknowns” as “known unknowns.”

First, the North Korea-Russia entente, solidified by their new treaty of strategic partnership, will complicate the geopolitical landscape. This alliance is evolving into a built-in structure rather than a temporary marriage of convenience. It is already undermining international efforts to denuclearize North Korea and bring peace and stability to Asia and Europe. North Korea, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), internationalized the conflict through its combat participation beyond merely providing weapons and munitions.

The greatest concern now is Russia’s potential quid pro quo for DPRK’s involvement in the war. Russian assistance in DPRK’s nuclear, missile and emerging technology sectors would be a nightmarish scenario, not just for South Korea, the United States and Japan, but for the international community as a whole. Their strategic deterrence and preemptive weapons of mass destruction use doctrine could severely weaken the allies’ deterrence capabilities and nuclear assurances.

China appears displeased with this development but is reluctant to abandon North Korea due to the escalating U.S.-China strategic competition. The no-limit strategic partnership between Russia and China remains a source of ongoing concern, indirectly linking to this axis.

Thus, our North Korea policy must now strategize over both the emerging new axis and Trump’s approach to revisionist countries.

Second, Trump 2.0 is likely to be more offensive, unilateral, focused, speedy, top-down and nondiscriminatory, regardless of friends or foes. We know Trump values unpredictability as a tactic, often making impulsive decisions. However, we can discern some predictable elements from the unknowns through his recent public statements, campaign pledges, the 2024 Republican Party Platform and the recent lineup of the Trump 2.0 Cabinet, not to mention Trump 1.0 policies.

On this basis, we can anticipate the nuts and bolts of America First foreign and trade policy to achieve the goal of Make America Great Again, or the MAGA movement, where transactionalism, economic nationalism, burden-sharing in alliances, less interventionism, rejection of globalism and fierce competition with China will be central themes. Trump will not wait for four full years but will push for quick returns and visible outcomes.

The Korean government should prepare its own transactional strategy to minimize the risks from the “Anything But Biden” approach, such as increasing pressure for defense burden-sharing and redressing trade imbalances and investment onshoring through universal tariffs. “Big Give and Big Take” may be one option, reinforced by collaboration on mutually beneficial areas such as shipbuilding, MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul), emerging and critical technology. Another option is to remind Trump 2.0 and the U.S. Congress of South Korea’s strategic value to its national security and the Indo-Pacific strategy, which was the brainchild of Trump 1.0. If Trump 2.0 is wise enough not to adopt a “penny-wise, but pound-foolish” approach, what is feared as “Trump risk” will turn into an opportunity for an upgraded strategic alliance.

The South Korean government should also provide timely input to the new Trump lineup before it finalizes its new North Korea policy, including the possible resumption of the U.S.-DPRK summit. This is what we did in 2017. “Peace through strength” is a commendable approach, and it should be coupled with precious lessons of history from bad deals like the Munich Agreement and the Paris Peace Accords, which resulted in catastrophic consequences before the ink dried. The Trump 2.0 cabinet is advised to read his eloquent speech before the Korean National Assembly in November 2017.

Third, South Korea should continue to demonstrate its democratic resilience and economic prowess again. As the U.S. saying goes, foreign policy begins at home. Now, many countries see the truth of this maxim for their own nations. In South Korea, the fate of the political leadership of both ruling and opposition parties and the early return to normalcy depends on both judicial and constitutional processes and the wisdom of diverse political forces to resolve this crisis in the nation’s interest.

Two weeks ago, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan perceptively mentioned, "We had Jan. 6. I think it's important for us to recognize that dramatic events happen even in highly advanced, consolidated democracies. The real test is can the democratic institutions hold at the end of the day even if they bend." He added, "The institutions in South Korea are holding."

In 2017, the Korean nation smoothly overcame the previous impeachment crisis without economic disaster or diplomatic "Korea passing." I was part of that transition team. As one of the maturing democracies, I believe that we shall overcome this time again, despite much more difficult circumstances at home and abroad.

For that, the current leadership in South Korea — administrative, legislative and judiciary — should not shrink from its grave obligations to navigate this Korean ship through turbulent waters in the safe and right direction.

Finally, Korea and the world are now entering a period of uncertainty, navigating both known and unknown challenges, driven by the rise of MAGA 2.0 and intense strategic confrontations between major powers. As William Burns, CIA director, aptly noted early last year, this is a world in which the United States no longer enjoys uncontested primacy. America cannot solve multiple complex challenges alone. Collaboration between the U.S. and its allies is sine qua non.

Trump said in Seoul in 2017 that “the Republic of Korea will be a faithful ally of the U.S. very long into the future” and emphasized last November in nominating Marco Rubio as his secretary of state that “I look forward to working with Marco, a true friend to our allies, to make America and the world safe and great again!" This is the right stance for Trump 2.0 to take.

Yun Byung-se, former foreign minister of ROK, is co-chair of the REAIM Global Commission and Chairman of Seoul International Law Academy.