Empower South Korea's crisis management

By Lee Jong-eun

On the morning of Dec. 3, I was giving a class lecture, explaining the “dynamic” features of contemporary South Korean politics. At the end of the lecture, one student said, “I read on social media that the South Korean president declared martial law.” It was unanticipated news that ironically reinforced the lecture’s theme.

Though President Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law attempt was quickly rescinded by the National Assembly, political repercussions followed. Several Cabinet ministers resigned, including the defense minister who had recommended martial law. The opposition-controlled National Assembly passed legislation for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the Yoon government on charges of treason. Most importantly, the opposition parties have demanded Yoon’s removal from the presidency through impeachment.

Despite the ruling party’s aversion to experiencing another president (since Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in 2016/17) leaving office in disgrace, political pressure from the widespread public disapproval of Yoon’s failed martial law declaration has ultimately resulted in the impeachment vote passing in the National Assembly, with a number of defections from the ruling People Power Party legislators.

The impact of the political crisis has been felt in foreign policy. The U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultation Group’s scheduled meeting was postponed. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin canceled his trip to Seoul. Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who had planned to visit early next year to mark the 60th anniversary of the normalization of Korea-Japan ties, has signaled an intention to observe the developments of the current political situation. For the international community, two urgent questions are “Can the post-impeachment interim government maintain governance?” and “Will the future elected South Korean government shift Korea’s foreign policy drastically?”

The first question reflects uncertainty toward Korea’s power vacuum from Yoon’s impeachment. Who would lead the interim government? The opposition Democratic Party of Korea had considered impeaching Prime Minister Han Duck-soo also for failing to prevent Yoon’s martial law but refrained in order to bring stability in the nation. As acting president, Han also faces the challenge of leading a demoralized Cabinet with several vacancies, including the position of defense minister. For the United States in particular, it is important to be certain whether the interim leader of an allied government will be able to assert clear authority over the military, which faces a leadership crisis and political backlash from its involvement in the failed marital law attempt.

The second question reflects uncertainty about Korea’s future foreign policy changes. In the past two years, the Yoon government has pursued foreign policies aligning more explicitly with the U.S.-led alliances in key geopolitical issues. The Yoon government joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum, pursued a trilateral security partnership with Japan and the U.S., expressed diplomatic support for Ukraine in its war with Russia and expanded arms exports to Europe.

The fall of Yoon’s government, however, may result in a repudiation of his foreign policy. The original draft of the impeachment motion criticized Yoon for “antagonizing Russia, China and North Korea” and pursuing a “pro-Japan policy” (this language was deleted in the final draft). With Rep. Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea, currently considered to have favorable prospects in winning the next presidential election, there are speculations, even concerns on whether the next elected South Korean government would drastically reorient South Korea’s foreign policy and back away from previous agreements made by the Yoon government.

Such concerns could have adverse effects on the interim government’s diplomatic credibility. In the next several months, far from advancing diplomatic negotiations with the incoming second Trump administration, South Korean policymakers may struggle to reassure and defend the existing diplomatic commitments.

The South Korean interim government should reassure the international community on these two critical questions. Whether it be a period of an impeachment trial in the Constitution Court or (if the court rules in favor of the impeachment) the transition period before the newly scheduled presidential election, it is critical for domestic politics to establish political consensus, or at least a “ selective truce” in this period of crisis management. This may sound idealistic in the current polarized political climate. However, the international community’s loss of confidence in South Korea’s caretaker government could have severe economic and security consequences for the country in the course of the next several months.

First, South Korean politics should empower whoever is ultimately designated as the head of the interim government with the minimum necessary political authority to carry out basic government operations. This includes the authority to issue policy directives to government agencies, enforce international agreements and direct the military to continue regular military exercises and deterrence measures toward North Korea in consultation with the United States. Furthermore, the interim government should attain public endorsements from corporations and labor, as well as key international institutions and businesses, to minimize socioeconomic instability that could impact not just Korea but the rest of the global economy.

Second, the political parties should ensure institutional prudence behind Korea’s future policymaking. Understandably, the opposition parties will have foreign policy platforms different from the current Yoon government. However, it is imperative that the parties provide two reassurances. First, the parties will review and consult the diplomatic negotiations undertaken by the interim government. Second, the next presidential administration (whether from the ruling or opposing party) will engage in domestic and international consultation before attempting major revisions to South Korea’s existing foreign policy.