By Jeon Su-mi
Following the U.S.-Japan summit in Washington on Feb. 7, U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba reiterated they have “grave concern(s) over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs” and their “firm commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea.” This statement underscores both the U.S. commitment to the principle of denuclearization and its willingness to engage in negotiations with Pyongyang.
The concept of North Korea’s denuclearization cannot be discussed without addressing three historical milestones: first, the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991 under former President George H.W. Bush; second, the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in December of the same year; and third, the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks in September 2005. The withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons facilitated the South-North denuclearization declaration, and the 2005 Joint Statement marked the first international agreement explicitly stipulating "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Subsequent South-North and U.S.-North Korea documents referencing "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" can be seen as extensions of the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement.
Despite these agreements, defining the scope and conditions of denuclearization remains the core challenge in U.S.-North Korea negotiations. The collapse of the 2019 Hanoi Summit exemplifies this difficulty. North Korea offered to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for partial sanctions relief, particularly those affecting its civilian economy. However, Trump rejected this proposal, arguing that the Yongbyon facility alone was insufficient without additional denuclearization commitments.
With Trump now serving a second term and the U.S. signaling openness to renewed dialogue, the possibility of another summit arises. However, North Korea’s deepened ties with Russia suggest that Pyongyang may demand greater concessions than it did in Hanoi. At the same time, Trump, eager to maintain a strong negotiating stance, is unlikely to offer less than his previous proposal. This deadlock underscores a fundamental dilemma: how to balance North Korea’s demands for sanctions relief with verifiable denuclearization steps.
In the absence of a viable military option for physically dismantling North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, several fundamental challenges must be addressed: How can North Korea’s nuclear weapon use be deterred? What measures can delay or halt its nuclear development? How can the number of nuclear weapons be reduced and ultimately eliminated? What are the realistically achievable goals for South Korea, the U.S. and Japan? Addressing these questions is vital for shaping a sustainable negotiation framework.
Kim Jong-un’s participation in the Hanoi Summit, driven by economic hardship due to sanctions, demonstrated that effective negotiations must strategically align sanctions relief with denuclearization commitments. However, differences in priorities between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan complicate the process. Before the Hanoi Summit, South Korea primarily focused on improving inter-Korean relations, whereas Japan urged Trump to address not only North Korea’s nuclear weapons but also its chemical and biological weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles targeting the U.S. mainland, as well as medium- and short-range missiles aimed at Japan. These diverging interests highlight the absence of a unified approach among key stakeholders.
A major challenge remains the lack of detailed trilateral discussions on how to match specific levels of denuclearization with corresponding sanctions relief. To move forward, South Korea, the U.S. and Japan must establish a clear roadmap based on the phased denuclearization framework outlined in the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement. This agreement not only sets out the final goal of complete denuclearization but also outlines the phased steps required to achieve it. North Korea itself was a signatory to this agreement, reaffirming it provides a viable foundation for renewed negotiations.
Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue requires a structured, reciprocal process. A well-defined roadmap — linking denuclearization steps with proportionate sanctions relief — can bridge the gap between Pyongyang’s demands and Washington’s security concerns. By prioritizing a coordinated strategy, South Korea, the U.S. and Japan can work toward the shared goal of achieving a stable and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
The writer is a professor and lawyer at Soongsil University in Seoul.