By Mason Richey
The Western world has reacted with horror and disgust at the animus displayed by U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their remarkable, disastrous meeting last week. Zelenskyy probably should have said as little as possible during the public portion of the event — he tried to advance Ukraine’s interests by being right rather than flattering Trump — but Trump’s and Vance’s hostile berating of their Ukrainian counterpart was deeply wrong, both morally and as a matter of U.S. interests. Zelenskyy has heroically defended Ukraine from Russian predation, while Trump’s White House is selling out to Russia like a rapacious mafia clan.
Rarely does the public get to see leaders in full disagreement — masks off, discussing high-stakes details of diplomatic issues — in such a public setting. This means the Trump-Vance meeting performance was also revelatory. Since Jan. 20, people in the U.S. have already been experiencing Trump as an American Nero, gleefully burning down the U.S. government, civil service and the rule of law. Now, the world is witnessing Trump destroying U.S. leadership of the rules-based international order.
It is unclear if there is rhyme or reason to this. Does Trump want to form an alternate international order based on global U.S. primacy? Is he playing a complicated game to split off Russia from China? Is he aiming at a 19th-century-style division of spheres of influence with Russia and China? Or how much of this is nihilism with no real plan for an alternate order? Regardless of the answer(s) to these questions, the Trump-Zelenskyy meeting has again made clear that the U.S. is not operating in the interests of allies and partners. As a hegemon, the U.S. has gone from benign to malign.
So, what does this mean for Seoul, Tokyo, Europe and the international community?
South Korea, like Japan and other Indo-Pacific states, has largely been spared the ire of Trump 2.0 until now. This is doubly fortunate for South Korea, considering its ongoing political turmoil and consequently weakened government. It won’t remain this way; the Trump administration will turn its attention to pressing Seoul soon enough. This is no secret, and the top-line issues are well known: tariffs, Special Measures Agreement renegotiation, potential disruption to combined military exercises, risky negotiations with North Korea, etc. The stock answers are also well known: conventional defense/security investment, greater budget flexibility for meeting U.S. demands, diversification of economic partners, etc.
But the fundamental question is the degree to which the U.S. is still a reliable ally of South Korea. It should be utterly clear to all involved now that Washington is no longer a values partner of anyone, including Seoul. Abandonment is possible, as is entrapment in a U.S.-provoked conflict with China or otherwise. Or perhaps things will be business as usual. The U.S. and South Korea still share important security interests and threat perceptions — but is that enough to keep the alliance solid? That is uncertain — recall that Trump’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war is not shared by the rest of NATO — which is why Seoul should hedge, deepening bilateral cooperation with Tokyo and advancing towards nuclear weapons latency. Most radical — and difficult — of all, South Korea needs greater domestic political unity, a point recently made by provisional president Choi Sang-mok. The world is the most dangerous it has been since the end of the Cold War, and succeeding in this environment will require national unity of strategic purpose.
Although more politically stable, Japan is in a similar situation, albeit with arguably less exposure to the North Korea risk and arguably more to crises in the cross-strait area or the South/East China Sea. One fears that Japan may not have fully absorbed the reality of the situation, considering that Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s summit with Trump went mostly smoothly. Nonetheless, while maintaining its relationship with the U.S., Japan should hedge, also investing heavily in military modernization, diverse economic partnerships, cooperation with South Korea, and, yes, nuclear weapons latency. That may sound crazy for a country allergic — for understandable reasons — to nuclear armament, but the discussion is already quietly taking place among elites in Tokyo.
Australia’s geographic isolation helps it enormously, but it should keep a wary eye on ongoing and future cooperation with the U.S., including especially progress on AUKUS. India is strategically independent of the U.S., which gives it flexibility, a valuable tool in working with a malleable, unmoored Trump administration.
Europe, on the other hand, finds its core security and defense interests at risk due to Trump administration 2.0 policies toward the Russia-Ukraine war. Although it should have been obvious by 2014, Europe — both the EU and non-US NATO — has finally gotten the message to develop strategic autonomy. It remains to be seen, however, if Europe can effectively and quickly adopt strategic shifts in defense and security spending to defend itself, support Ukraine and deter Russia from future aggression.
As for small states and middle powers, a hollowed-out rules-based international order is bad, as power alone increasingly drives outcomes in world affairs. If you are not at the table, you are on the menu. The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. Prepare accordingly.
Mason Richey is a professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, president of the Korea International Studies Association and editor-in-chief of the Journal of East Asian Affairs.
English (United States) ·